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Since its admission to the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in
2001, China has been in the process of complying with the commitments
required by the accession agreement.1 This paper addresses the following
question: As China and other developing countries come to play a more
prominent role in today's global economy, will Western industrialized
countries adapt to this change or will they use the WTO to suppress
China's ascension to power? This paper will explore three different factors
for the existing tension in the WTO between China and developed
democratic countries like the United States. The arguments are as follows:
1) China's legal system is founded upon very different principles and
historical traditions than those of the United States; 2) the different legal
systems have led to different interpretations of China's obligations under
the WTO; and 3) developing countries are unfairly repressed by developed
countries within the WTO.
The respective positions of the main players involved are highlighted
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009; Bachelor of Arts,
Government, Claremont McKenna College, 2004.
1. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Library of Congress, China Country Profile, 4-34 (2007)
(China's entry into the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in 2001 was marked by further economic
liberalization measures that China had committed to in the accession accords. WTO membership has
sparked an increase in foreign investment, rising from US $38.4-billion in 2000 to US $79. 1-billion in
2005, and thereby reversing the fall in foreign direct investment inflows occurring in the aftermath of
the 1997-98 Asian market crisis.).
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in the recent WTO dispute between China and Western developed
countries over Chinese restrictions on foreign financial information service
providers. This paper will use the WTO dispute as a case study illustrating
how the three factors listed above have played into and given rise to the
controversy.
II. CHINA'S LEGAL HISTORY
To appreciate China's position on implementation within the WTO, it
is helpful to understand China's attitude on law and to appreciate its legal
history. Although China's modern legal system began only thirty years
ago, China's legal culture is among the world's most ancient. By 2000
B.C. a mature language had developed in Beijing and shortly thereafter,
law.2 By 536 B.C., China had developed its first body of statutory law, the
Xingding Code.3 From the Han Dynasty (206 BC to AD 220) to the early
modem period, China was among the most technologically advanced
countries in the world.4 The critical distinction between Western law and
Chinese law is the concept of rule of law versus rule by law, respectively.
Rule of law entails a situation where all members of a state are subject to
the law regardless of status.5 Rule by law refers to a situation where the
state uses law merely as a tool to justify its actions, where the highest rank
of state leadership is exempt from the law. 6 As shown below, China's legal
culture has been and is still characterized by rule by law despite recent
efforts to navigate towards a system of rule of law.
During China's 2,000-year-long imperial era, the legal system
remained largely static. The emperor was above the law-he reserved the
right to alter the law at any time by imperial decree. Today, while the
National People's Congress ("NPC") is theoretically the supreme organ of
the government under China's constitution, in reality the Chinese
Communist Party ("CCP") is the one that sets the policy and possesses the
ability to remove NPC statesmen.7 The capitalist revolution has borne
limited democratic fruits due to the fact that economic reforms greatly
outpace any political and legal reforms.8 The CCP appears to be resisting
2. Bradley L. Milkwick, Feeling for Rocks While Crossing the River: The Gradual Evolution of
Chinese Law, 14:2 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 289 (2005).
3. Id.
4. China Country Profile, supra note 1, at 4.
5. Milkwick, supra note 2, at 297 (italics added).
6. Id. (italics added).
7. China Country Profile, supra note 1, at 6-8.
8. See generally Leontine D. Chuang, Investing in China's Telecommunications Market:
Reflections on the Rule of Law and Foreign Investment in China, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 509
(2000). This is especially true where the laws have little relevance to the economy.
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change and is instead clinging onto the vestiges of what some call
"democratic dictatorship." 9 The late Deng Xiaoping aptly characterized the
resistance to change by stating that "one must feel for rocks while crossing
a river."
1 °
China has seen four major regime changes since the People's Republic
of China ("PRC") was founded in 1949, each regime governed respectively
by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. Mao
Zedong's rule can be likened to the rule of the emperors who reigned
centuries before him. During Mao's administration, there was an absence
of statutes governing even the elementary crimes of murder, theft, and
rape. I I Crimes were still tried under the general Statute on Punishment for
Counterrevolutionary Activity, created in 1951.12 Furthermore, as it often
happened, CCP policy would control when statutory authority was found
lacking. 13  What Mao did accomplish was to end a long tradition of
feudalism, China's opium addiction, and diplomatic embarrassment at the
hands of "Western imperialists."' 4 Thus, while Mao certainly rid China of
some of its most burdensome evils, he failed to establish consistent
adherence to constitutional law, above and beyond CCP policy.
With the second regime, Deng Xiaoping ushered in a new era with the
1982 Constitution, which eliminated some of the Maoist ideology so
prevalent in the 1978 Constitution. Although the CCP still held sole
oversight power, it appeared to begin following a trend where it was
relinquishing power to the state's other legislative organs in more
significant and meaningful ways, with more authority being delegated
them.15 The 19 80s were a time of stimulating change as legal education
was starting to flourish and the economy was developing at an
unprecedented rate.16 A corpus of civil law containing a small chapter
regarding the "application of laws to civil matters involving foreign
elements" was formed.'7  Thus, Deng concluded a thirty-year hiatus on
international trade and bestowed greater authority and legitimacy to state
organs other than the CCP.
The third regime was led by Jiang Zemin, beginning in 1993.
Following the Tiananmen Square event under Deng, Jiang launched a new
9. Milkwick, supra note 2, at 290.
10. Id. at 291.
11. Tao-Tai Hsia, National Report: People's Republic of China, the Legal System and Literature of
the People's Republic of China, 2 INT'L. J.L. LIBR. 74, 78 (1974).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 79.
14. Milkwick, supra note 2, at 291.
15. Id. at 295.
16. See Tung-Pi Chen, Private Int l Law of the People's Republic of China: An Overview, 35 AM.
J. COMP. L. 445 (1987).
17. Id. at 450-51.
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concept involving a "rule of law" regime where he stated the "the Party
should never replace the government and override law."' 8 Although public
administration had become more regular and more Chinese were made
aware of what the law was, the repression of the Falungong was a
counterpoint to the regime's legal evolution.' 9 Having been compared to
the Tiananmen massacre, the Falungong repression has been said to show
China's adamant intent to maintain the status quo in terms of political
20power.
Lastly, Hu Jintao is the present CCP Secretary General of the fourth
regime, coming into power in 2003. Thus far, Hu's leadership is most
notable for bringing about China's accession into the WTO. Such
accession has produced a profound impact on the country's legal reform.
For example, WTO admission provided a strong incentive for the
government to enact state-owned enterprise reform in the quest to prepare
China's industry for the further liberalization measures as promised in its
WTO commitments.2' While China's admission into the WTO is indeed a
great leap forward in its legal evolution there are still practical and difficult
implementation issues for a country steeped in the tradition of centuries of
powerful unitary rule by law.
As shown China's modern legal system has different roots from the
Western legal system which make a transition to rule of law more difficult
and complex. China's long historical experience involving rule by law will
inevitably affect its understanding and application of a modern legal system
governed by rule of law. In contrast, the U.S. Constitution was adopted in
the early years of the country's establishment and U.S. law was initially
largely derived from English common law. The crafting of English
common law began as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.22 Much
of Germany and France's civil law was established during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.23
China has stated that while it will look to the legal systems of the
West for guidance, it will develop a Chinese socialist legal system with
Chinese characteristics.24 Some scholars have argued that the word "law"
18. Milkwick, supra note 2, at 296-97.
19. Falungong is a religious movement with millions of followers that experienced its height of
popularity in China in the latter part of the 1990s. When thousands of Falungong members gathered
around a government building to protest the government's criticism of their religion, the government
arrested and allegedly tortured many of the organization's leaders. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S
LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 91-93 (2002).
20. Milkwick, supra note 2, at 299-300 ("[l]ts economy would approach capitalism, but politically,
it would remain communist.").
21. China Country Profile, supra note 1, at 33.
22. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY OF LAW
206-10 (Oxford University Press 2000).
23. Id. at 124.
24. State Council Information Office, China 's Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of
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in Western languages in fact has four different interpretations in Chinese.25
They include 1i ("order"), li ("rules of propriety"), fa ("human made laws),
and zhi ("control").26 All of these definitions can be seen in how China has
been advancing its legal system and implementing its international
obligations. Western definitions of law are more singular and less
encompassing.
Thus, the U.S. and other Western European countries have had
centuries of practicing and solidifying a culture and legal system of rule of
law. As one scholar as cautioned, in order to develop a balanced and
reasonable understanding of China's legal system we must recognize that
there is no single path to development and there is no "one-size fits all"
approach to rule of law.27
III. DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS LEAD TO DIFFERENT
INTERPRETATIONS
Due to the different foundations and ideas supporting China's legal
system, it is inevitable that it should engender dissimilar interpretations
about what certain legal obligations mean.
An example of differing interpretations is that regarding what the legal
limits of censorship are under the WTO. For the most part, the question
has been avoided due to a mutual sense among major trading nations that
censorship is not to be equated with a trade barrier under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") and that it falls outside the
scope of the WTO's concerns. 28 Despite this tacitly understood sense,
there lacks strong textual sup3ort for a blanket claim that WTO scrutiny
does not apply to censorship.2  This lack of textual support is particularly
potent when a country uses censorship to create trade discrimination
limiting market access.
The GATS focuses on anti-discrimination and market access rules.
With respect to discrimination, GATS focuses on (1) discrimination
between exporting countries, and (2) discrimination between local and
imported products. In terms of market access, GATS creates a framework
for market access commitments allowing service providers access to the
domestic market. Thus, GATS allows countries to individually agree on
Law (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.china.org.cn/govemment/news/2008-02/28/content
I 10254864.htm.
25. Yan Fu, Fayi, ["The Spirit of the Laws"] (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1981) at 2.
26. Id.
27. PEERENBOOM, supra note 19, at 2-6.
28. Tim Wu, Legal Implications of A Rising China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 263, 264 (2006).
29. Id.
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different degrees of market access obligations in an ongoing, sector-by-
sector basis. This means that the actual commitments to liberalize trade
in services are a complex, country and sector specific pattern.
GATS also contains a set of exceptions describing what countries may
or may not do notwithstanding the GATS rules.3' The selected exceptions
that follow are the apparent authority for the as yet untested theory that
censorship is not to be considered a trade barrier under GATS.32 The two
most relevant 'general exceptions' for trade in information services for the
purposes of this paper include the following: exceptions of measures that
are "(1) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; or
(2) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement.
' 3
To reduce abuses of the use of the GATS exceptions, it has a
"chapeau" that limits the use of exceptions to circumstances where the laws
at issue "are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination... , or a disguised restriction on
trade in services. 34 There are also limits on the public order exception as
suggested in footnote five of GATS which states, "[t]he public order
exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious
threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society."35 Therefore,
as appealing as the exceptions may seem, they also do not provide a carte
blanche to engage in any activity and invoke the protection of the
exceptions. Nonetheless, the word "necessary" has been construed by
Korean Beef and other cases, to convey a less-restrictive-means test,
involving the question "whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is
reasonably available" to maintain public order or to protect public morals.36
An example of a point of tension between the U.S. and China that has
been exacerbated by China's entry into the WTO is the two countries'
differing definitions of appropriate censorship. China has passed a number
of measures limiting the Chinese public's access to foreign news. Xinhua
News Agency is China's official news agency as well as its largest news
provider. Xinhua is also a major organ of the CCP central committee and
one of China's chief vehicles for propaganda.37 The Agency has long acted
30. Id. at 271.
31. Id. at 274.
32. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125, 1177.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1178 n.12.
36. Appellate Body Report, Korea -Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef
162, 166, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000). See also Appellate Body Report, European
Community-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 172-74,
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
37. Tony Walker, China Threatens Flow of Business Information, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 18,
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as the sole intermediary between foreign news agencies and the Chinese
media regarding the distribution of both news and economic information to
ensure that sensitive content is censored prior to reaching the general
audience.38
An illustrative example of Xinhua's integral role in the Chinese
government is the headline in a 1993 news article entitled, "How Xinhua is
Pulling [Hong Kong] to China: The News Agency is Midwife of the
Colony's Return to the Motherland., 39 The article observes how in Hong
Kong, Xinhua was the face of the Chinese central government, noting how
the regime rarely does anything unintentionally.n Moreover, when China
was still a diplomatic pariah, it was Xinhua's foreign affairs department
that met with diplomatic representatives of countries with which China had
no formal ties. Xinhua exercised a monopoly over the distribution of
Western news agency material until the 1980s.4 2  The agency's senior
officials are drawn from the upper echelons of the CCP.
43
However, this domination of the news market was weakened by
technological advances such as satellite communications and a surge in
demand for business information. In 1996, Xinhua had tried to implement
controls and hefty fees on foreign news agency sales to various Chinese
financial institutions but ultimately abandoned efforts after strong protests
from U.S. and European Union ("E.U.") trade negotiators. It is easy to see
how the broad concerns of Chinese law which include social order, stability
and propriety is a uniquely sovereign concern that at the very least is
justified under the GATS exceptions.
From the viewpoint of China, protecting the public morals and the
developing domestic information industries from excessive foreign
competition may be deemed "fundamental interests of society" warranting
censorship. From the viewpoint of the U.S. and E.U. however, such
protection is seen as unnecessary, overly broad and in violation of GATS
agreements to liberalize the market. What is important to recognize is that
there may be legitimate differences in values and opinions at stake and
reasonable people may reach very different conclusions over certain issues.
Such difference in values will not evaporate simply because the two parties
1996, at 4.
38. Mure Dickie, Brussels Condemns Beijing Over Move to Curb Foreign News Agencies,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 12, 2006, at 14.
39. Simon Holberton, How Xinhua is Pulling HK to China: The News Agency is Midwife of the
Colony's Return to the Motherland, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at 6.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Tony Walker, China Threatens Flow of Business Information, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 18,
1996, at 4. Rebecca Blumenstein & Jason Dean, US., E.U to Challenge China's Financial-News
Rules, WALL ST. J. (E. Ed.), Mar. 3, 2008, at B2.
43. Holberton, supra note 39.
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are now part of the same international organization.
IV. THE CURRENT WTO STRUCTURE IS UNFAIR
In addition to some scholars questioning the benefits of adopting a
Western and especially an American legal system at the expense of China's
traditional system, there is the argument that the WTO is unfairly
structured to favor the Western developed countries. a  The WTO is a rule-
based system where members subscribe to common rules regarding
international trade.45 Some critics complain that such rules are a type of
world government that limits national sovereignty.46 Developing countries
complain that the system is based more on power than on rules-that the
powerful nations make the rules at the WTO (just as they do at the IMF and
World Bank, the two other institutions of global economic governance).47
They further argue that because of their market power, the dominant
developed nations are able to act unilaterally to avoid the rules to promote
their own interests and protect their own markets.48 In other words, rather
than helping to balance the playing field for the less powerful, the rule-
based WTO functions to maintain privilege and power. Developing
country advocates have argued that international economic regimes
reinforce unequal allocations of wealth both within national economies and
among nations. 49 Additionally, scholars have noted the failure of the free
trade movement to maximize the welfare of societies in general.50
The foremost complaint in this arena is that the organization attempts
to treat all members alike without recognizing the handicaps of these
different groups of countries.51 Specifically, there are aspects of the WTO
agreements that are disadvantageous to the developing countries. These
include the issue of intellectual property rights as well as the exclusion of
44. Gregory C. Chow, The Impact of Joining the WTO on China's Economic, Legal and Political
Institutions, PRINCETON J. OF ECON. LITERATURE A12 011 P2, 8 (2001).
45. Tom Barry, What's This Organization (WTO): An Annotated Glossary of Terms and Concepts





49. Stephen Zamora, Book Review: John W. Head, The Future of the Global Economic
Organizations: An Evaluation of Criticisms Leveled at the IMF, the Multilateral Development Banks,
and the WTO, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 177, 178 (2006) (book review).
50. See generally John W. Head, The Future of the Global Economic Organizations: An
Evaluation of Criticisms Leveled at the IMF, the Multilateral Development Banks, and the WTO,
Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers (2005).
51. O.A. Odiase-Alegimenlen, Globalization, The World Trade Organization and Developing
States, 12 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 24, 25 (2003).
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developing States from some developed nations' markets through the use
of non-tariff measures. These disadvantaged nations are then required to
open up markets to imports from developed industrialized nations and
provide intellectual property protection for technology originating in the
industrialized States.
Another common criticism is the lack of transparency-that only
insiders make and judge the rules. It most often refers to the lack of
openness in the process of rule making and dispute settlement in the WTO.
Such complaints are routinely coupled with criticism that the WTO is not
participatory. This lack of transparency will only serve to make all
members but the most powerful uneasy.
Consequently, it should not be a surprise that the WTO has become
an organization that the developing country members have grown to
distrust. A primary reason is the suspicion of the agenda of the developed
nations who are the initiators of the concept of globalization.53 The distrust
is exacerbated by the fact that developing states end up simply producing
primary goods for export to the developed nations, which are resold to
them at high cost after some value has been added in the developed
States.54 The developing country's government is then required to institute
a liberal deregulated economy without protection of the productive or
service sectors of the economy. This is all supposedly targeted towards
creating an open and competitive economy. Deregulation may only mean
that the market or economy of the developing State is taken over by
imports to the detriment of the local producer or service provider. Hence,
the tension between China as a developing country and the Western
developed countries within the WTO should be apparent, especially as
China seeks to become one of the main WTO power players.
V. CASE STUDY: 2008 WTO DISPUTE THAT CHINA IS ILLEGALLY
RESTRICTING FOREIGN FINANCIAL INFORMATION SERVICE
PROVIDERS IN CHINA
We now look at how China's admission into the WTO has intersected
with the tension inherent in China's goals of continued economic and legal
advancement while remaining a relatively controlled Communist State. In
March 2008, after months of failed negotiating, The U.S. and E.U. filed a
complaint with the WTO against China regarding Chinese restrictions on
foreign financial information service providers, allegedly in violation of its
52. Barry, supra note 45.
53. O.A. Odiase-Alegimenlen, supra note 51.
54. Id.
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WTO accession commitments.
A. BACKGROUND TO THE WTO DISPUTE
As part of its WTO accession agreements, China committed to the
substantial opening of a broad range of service sectors via the elimination
of many existing market access restrictions in sectors such as banking,
56Chninsurance, telecommunications, and professional services. While China
did adhere to openings required by its WTO accession agreement, it would
often erect terms of entry that were so high or cumbersome so as to prevent
or dishearten foreign suppliers from gaining market access.
Additionally, according to the American Chamber of Commerce's 2006
White Paper, China's current regulations prohibit foreign individuals and5g
companies from providing investment advice onshore. The members of
the American Chamber of Commerce believe that allowing international
players to conduct advisory services onshore can only be beneficial to the
local investment environment's growth and development.59
While it is easy to assume a critical approach to China's varying
degrees of compliance in certain sectors, one should remember the
lingering historical challenges as well as the difficulty of adapting a
Communist country accustomed to exercising a heavy regulatory hand to
rapid economic growth. China has experienced a roughly 9 percent
economic growth 6Ver year since the country's move away from central
planning in 1978. This growth has not been without its own growing
pains. China experienced how volatile that expansion could be in various
boom-bust cycles between 1978 and 2000 and officials have been wary
against guarding against such further damaging episodes.61 It comes as no
great surprise that the leaders of China have experienced some struggles
with balancing the domestic interests of maintaining stable economic
liberalization and international obligations to remove market access
restrictions.
55. Daniel Pruzin, E.U. Prepares Ground for Possible WTO Action on China Financial
Information Restrictions, 25:6 INT'L TRADE REPORTER, Feb. 7, 2008, at 198.
56. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2006 National Trade Estimate on Foreign Trade
Barriers 128, (2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/Reports-Publications/2006/
2006_NTE -Report/SectionIndex.html.
57. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 56, at 129.
58. American Chamber of Commerce-China, White Paper: American Business in China 92 (2006),
available at http://www.amcham-china.org.cn/amcham/show/content.phpld = 570&menuid=& submid=.
59. Id. ("AmCham members believe that allowing international players to conduct advisory
services onshore will help educate local investors, upgrade the industry's research capabilities, and
discipline listed companies, while gradually raising overall market confidence.").




The U.S. and the E.U. formally initiated WTO dispute settlement
proceedings against China on March 3, 2008, for what Washington and
Brussels claim are China's "illegal restrictions on foreign financial
information service providers. 62 The U.S. and the E.U. submitted separate
requests for WTO consultations with China.63 The WTO has an agency
called the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). If consultations and
conciliation or mediation fail to resolve problems between members after
sixty days, a complaining party can ask the DSB to establish a panel
comprised of qualifying experts who are not citizens of the countries to the
dispute. 64 After hearing the arguments, the panel then issues a report of its
findings and it recommends that the member "withdraw the offending
measure" if it finds a violation.65 The finding is adopted sixty days after
the report has been circulated to the members unless the DSB decides by
consensus not to adopt the report.66 On the other hand, a disputing party
may choose to resort to the standing Appellate Body established by the
DSB comprised of a three-person group selected from the seven-member
Appellate Body of the WTO.6 7 The Appellate Body's finding will be
adopted by the DSB and "unconditionally accepted by the parties to the
dispute" unless it is decided otherwise by the DSB by consensus.
68
1. China's Contested 2006 Administration Measure issued by Xinhua
News Agency
What is at issue is the September 2006 administrative measure
entitled, "Measures for Administering the Release of News and
Information in China by Foreign News Agencies" (hereinafter "2006
Measure"), issued by China's state-owned Xinhua News Agency
prohibiting foreign financial information services such as Bloomberg, Dow
Jones Newswires, and Reuters from establishing a commercial presence in
China and hindered their ability to sell their services directly to Chinese
domestic clients.69
The 2006 Measure regulates the "release of news and information in
China by foreign news agencies and the subscription of such news and
62. Daniel Pruzin & Kathleen McLaughlin, U.S., E.U. File WTO Complaints Against China's
Restrictions on Financial Information Services, 25:10 INT'L TRADE REPORTER, Mar. 6, 2008, at 328.
63. Id.
64. DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS
PROBLEMS 136 (4th ed. 2008).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (explaining that the seven-member Appellate Body within the WTO serve four-year terms
subject to a one-time reappointment).
68. Id.
69. Pruzin & McLaughlin, supra note 62.
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information by users in China and to promote the dissemination of news
and information in a sound and orderly manner."7 ° Its application to the
release of all "news and information," spreads a wide net. Further, the
broad scope of materials falling within the ambit of the general category of
"information" is neither defined nor limited in the 2006 Measure. The
absence of a clear definition or any attempt at a definition was likely
intentional so as to leave within the regulatory authority of the state-owned
Xinhua all "information" transmitted by foreign news agencies. Whatever
other purposes might arguably be veiled behind the stated purpose, the
"sound and orderly" ideal finds strong roots in China, especially since the
CCP takeover. To support this, Qin Gang, a foreign ministry spokesman,
said that the new rules were intended to promote "healthy and orderly"
dissemination of news, while "protecting the lawful rights and interests of
foreign news agencies and their domestic clients. 71 He added, "This is an
internal affair of China.,
72
Foreign news agencies are defined as including "other foreign entities
of the nature of a news agency that release news and information
products. 73 This conveniently places foreign financial information service
providers under the umbrella of a Xinhua regulation. Such foreign news
services are to operate subject to the approval of Xinhua News Agency and
through an agent designated by Xinhua.74 As of the end of February 2008,
the only agent designated by Xinhua was a Xinhua affiliate.75 Moreover,
Xinhua recently initiated its own financial information service in direct
competition with foreign suppliers, "Xinhua '08.,,76 The 2006 Measure
also prohibits foreign news agencies from "directly77 solicit[ing]
subscription" of their news and information services in China. This was a
tightening of the requirements since prior to the 2006 Measure, foreign
agencies were permitted to distribute news and data directly to government
approved clients such as banks and large companies.78
A list of ten categories delineate what material may not be included in
70. Congressional - Executive Commission on China (virtual academy), New Measures Increase
Xinhua Control over Foreign News Sources, Art. One (Sept. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=69668 (emphasis added).
71. Mure Dicke, Beijing Ignores Attacks by U.S. and E.U. on 'Restrictive' Censorship Rules,
FrNANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at 3.
72. Id.
73. Measures for Administering the Release of News and Information in China by Foreign News
Agencies (promulgated by the Xinhua News Agency, Sep. 10, 2006, effective Sep. 10, 2006), 2006
China Law LEXIS 5577.
74. Id.
75. Gary Yerkey, U.S. Still Lacks Sign China Acting to Avert WTO Complaint Over Financial Info
Providers, 25:8 INT'L TRADE REPORTER, Feb. 21, 2008, at 271.
76. Pruzin & McLaughlin, supra note 62.
77. Measures for Administering the Release of News and Information in China by Foreign New
Agencies, supra note 73.
78. Dickie, supra note 71.
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news and information released by foreign news agencies in China.
Examples of such prohibited content include information that "endanger
China's national security, reputation, and interests" or "spread false
information, disrupt China's economic and social order, or undermine
China's social stability. ' 79  These exceptions tend to support China's
argument that it is simply trying to continue to encourage economic growth
and investment in the country, only in a more structured and controlled
manner involving State oversight.
Penalties are imposed upon violating foreign entities. Based on the
merits of each case, Xinhua is given the authority to issue a variety of
sanctions ranging from giving warnings to suspending or canceling its
qualifications as a foreign news agency for releasing news and information
in China. Essentially, the violations comport with the two main
requirements mandating Xinhua approval and banning direct solicitation in
China.
2. Xinhua's Role
To date, Xinhua has only approved one company to act on its behalf
with respect to approving the news provided by foreign financial service
providers. That company is called the China Economic Information
Service ("CEIS"), a subsidiary of Xinhua News Agency itself.81 The 2006
Measures issued by Xinhua required Reuters Group PLC, Bloomberg LP,
Dow Jones & Co., and other foreign financial information service
companies to sell their products through the CEIS.82 This step essentially
negated a painstakingly negotiated deal from a decade earlier between
Chinese and U.S. officials that had only required that foreign financial
information service providers register themselves and their clients with
79. Measures for Administering the Release of News and Information in China by Foreign News
Agencies, supra note 72. Information may not contain any of the following that serves to: "(1) violate
the basic principles enshrined in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China; (2) undermine
China's national unity and sovereignty . . . ; (3) endanger China's national security, reputation, and
interests; (4) violate China's religious policies ... ; (5) incite hatred and discrimination among ethnic
groups, undermine their unity, infringe upon their customs and habits or hurt their feelings; (6) spread
false information, disrupt China's economic and social order, or undermine China's social stability; (7)
propagate obscenity and violence, or abet crimes; (8) humiliate or slander another person ...; (9)
undermine social ethics or the fine cultural traditions of the Chinese nation; and (10) include other
banned content by Chinese laws."
80. Id. The types of violations are listed as follows: "(1) Releasing news and information beyond
the scope of business as approved in the approval document; (2) directly soliciting subscription of news
and information services, or doing so in disguised form; and (3) distributing news and information
which contains material specified in Article II of these Measures."
81. Rebecca Blumenstein & Jason Dean, U.S., E. U to Challenge China's Financial-News Rules,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2008, at B2.
82. Id.
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Xinhua. Xinhua News Agency created "Xinhua 08" eight months after the
2006 Measures were announced. "Xinhua 08" is supposed to be a real-time
financial data service claimed to supply data for more than 20 major
exchanges in China as well as overseas. Basically, this means that
Xinhua News Agency is both an industry player and an industry regulator.
This dual role ostensibly creates a regulatory conflict of interest in Western
perceptions, but for China it is only a natural outgrowth of a more heavily
regulated, socialist legal system.
The government in China has insisted that it merely wants a "level
playing field" in the information market arena, and it disclaims any
intention to restrict the flow of financial information or to discriminate
against foreign companies.84 Xinhua's president, Tian Congming, is said to
have placed a priority on the agency's effort to make its economic
information products able to compete internationally and eventually to even
replace the services of Reuters in the domestic market.
85
However, thus far Xinhua has not taken action against any of the
international agencies' financial news arms, despite the fact that they have
refused to abide by the new 2006 Measures and are not operating with valid
business licenses.86 The lack of enforcement action may perhaps be
construed as a possible indication of China's hesitancy or rethinking of its
2006 Measure or China may simply be giving the U.S. and E.U. some time
to reflect on the fact that it is dealing with a government based on
historically different foundations. At the least, it gives some hope of sort of
conciliatory settlement amongst the main players in the dispute.
B. THE U.S. AND THE E.U. ARGUE CHINA IS NOT LIVING UP TO ITS WTO
PROMISE
Washington argues that China made a commitment in its 2001 WTO
accession agreement to remove market access limitations relating to
"provision and transfer of financial information, and financial data
processing and related software by suppliers of other financial services"
upon its entrance into the WTO.8 European Trade Commissioner, Peter
Mandelson, said in a statement on March 3, 2008, that "[c]ompetitive and
open financial services information markets are the lifeblood of a strong
financial sector, but China's rules have tipped the balance against foreign
companies., '88  Mandelson's concern appears to be not only for the
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Mure Dickie, West Takes China Media Move to WTO, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 3, 2008, at 4.
86. Id.
87. Pruzin, supra note 55.
88. Pruzin & McLaughlin, supra note 62.
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continued growth and competitiveness of China's financial sector but also
for more fair treatment of foreign financial companies in order to ensure
their continued viability in China's domestic financial sector.
On March 3, 2008, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab declared
that "[i]t is not in China's interest to restrict access to the high-quality,
comprehensive financial information provided by foreign service suppliers.
Financial market professionals in domestic and foreign banks, investment
firms, and other businesses in China need real-time access to this
information from diverse sources-foreign and domestic-in order to make
effective business decisions. ' 89  The new 2006 rules effectively gave
Xinhua a chokehold on the multi-million dollar business of providing
financial information to China's financial institutions (i.e., banks,
brokerages). As seen here, much of the persuasive argument from U.S.
officials stems from the idea that it is in China's own best interest to
comply with its WTO commitments.
The U.S. and the E.U. further argue that these restrictions violate
China's commitments under the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS). 90 Here, the argument is that China violates GATS by
discriminating between local and imported [financial information] services
by not complying with its market access obligations, thereby resulting in
foreign providers operating at a competitive disadvantage.
When the 1996 Measures curbing market access to foreign financial
information service providers was initially passed, it was argued by the
West that commercial, not political, motives were most influential in the
decision. The argument stated as its foundation that by acquiring the right
to "supervise" foreign agencies' operations, Xinhua was able to insist on a
share of their local revenues. 9' However, when the 2006 Measures were
passed, a Xinhua employee declared that if the Xinhua designated
regulatory affiliate, CEIS, makes any profit it will only be passed directly
onto the central government and Xinhua itself will not receive any of the
profits.92 Even assuming this to be true, Xinhua is a state-owned news
agency and as such Xinhua still benefits even if it does not directly receive
the profits garnered from supervising foreign economic agencies.
C. CHINA REPLIES IT IS PROVIDING FOR SOUND AND ORDERLY NEWS
DISSEMINATION
The Chinese government has justified the 2006 Measures as necessary
89. Id. at 329.
90. Id.
91. Editorial, China's Curbs, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, at 21.
92. Dickie, supra note 38.
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to standardize the distribution of information by foreign news agencies and
to counter "a near monopoly" over financial information by developed
countries. 93  The September 10, 2006, People's Daily said that the
Measures are meant to "promote the dissemination of news and
information in a sound and orderly manner., 94 Premier Wen Jiabao has
defended the 2006 Measures restrictions, calling the negative response to
the rules simply a "misunderstanding" and in turn, affirming that "China
will strive to ensure that the flow of financial and economic information
will not meet any obstruction. 95  Given the existing criticism by
developing countries that the WTO lacks transparency and is favorable to
developed countries, it is not difficult to understand why China would
argue that its efforts to counter a near monopoly of its foreign financial
information is reasonable.
In an attempt to bring some levity to the situation, Mr. Yuan
Xiaoping, a senior official of Xinhua, dismisses the accusation that
Xinhua's combined role as rival and regulator might jeopardize the flow of
financial information by saying, "I wouldn't have to wait for foreign
agencies to complain. Our domestic financial enterprises would criticize us
to death. They'd bash our heads in with hammers."96  The different
responses illustrate some of the different cultural influences embedded in
the dispute. For China, at least partially, the issue stems from the view that
as a country it should be able to dictate to some extent what content it will
permit to reach the general population.
A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Mr. Qin Gang, replied in 2006
to Western criticism of the 2006 Measures by saying, "There is no such
thing as absolute freedom in any count 7 . Rights and freedom are always
exercised within a legal framework."9  The irony of this statement in
response to American disapproval must be apparent. Nonetheless, what
China is arguing with respect to rights being exercised within a legal
framework is not necessarily in direct contradiction to what the US and
E.U. are stating, which is that China abide by the international legal
framework provided for in the WTO via its accession agreements. China is
thus delegated the arduous task of finding a solution that enables it to
exercise its sovereign power and authority to govern and protect China in
the face of rapid economic development within the larger international laws
created by powerful Western countries.
93. New Measures Increase Xinhua Control Over Foreign News Sources, supra note 69.
94. Rules on News Release by Foreign News Agencies Issued, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, (Sept. 10,
2006), available at http://english.people.com.cn/200609/l 0/eng200609 I 030 I 348.html.
95. New Measures Increase Xinhua Control Over Foreign News Sources, supra note 69.
96. Mure Dickie, Battle Lines Form Over Xinhua 's Plan to Control Foreign News Agencies,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at 5.
97. Dickie, supra note 38.
Vol. 5:1
WILL CHINA PREVAIL?
1. China Argues That What Is Truly At Dispute Is The Definition of a
"News Agency"
China declares that despite their claims to be financial information
providers or financial service companies, China believes the outlets in
question are in reality news agency services and that China has made no
WTO accession commitment on opening up its market to news agency
services in general. 98 While this latter argument is true, it may be a
difficult position to maintain if foreign financial information service
providers like Bloomberg are truly conveying nothing more than purely
financial, investment related information. Moreover, China specifically
agreed in its WTO accession agreements to liberalize market access for the
"provision and transfer of financial information, and financial data
processing and related software by supplier of other financial services." 99
Interestingly though, foreign companies have complained that Xinhua
has been using its regulatory authority to increase control over content
distribution and expanding the definition of "wire service" to establish a
monopoly on the dissemination of financial and sports news. 00 This raises
a few issues, not least of which is the concern the U.S. and E.U. have
regarding the incompatible dual role of Xinhua as both regulator of and
industry player in financial information services. While the Chinese
government may simply be trying to maintain its control over increased
access to foreign information and public opinion, the fact remains that
China will not be able to feasibly retain the same level of control over
importation of information as it may have been able to prior to becoming a
major global participant.'0 '
The director the Central Propaganda Department has supposedly
appealed to CCP's propagandists to thwart the "Western enemy forces...
from using their economic and technical superiority [from] carry[ing] out
ideological infiltration and cultural expansion" in order to Westernize and
divide China.'0 2 Such strong statements by an active arm of the Chinese
government is strong indication of the continued, longstanding mistrust of
Western motives, recognizing the large but now somewhat narrower gap in
ideology and culture particularly noticeable in the economic arena.
Formally, China has argued that the 2006 Measures requiring operation
through a designated agent is meant to facilitate access by helping foreign
98. Pruzin & McLaughlin, supra note 62.
99. World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, at 37 (Oct.
2001).
100. New Measures Increase Xinhua Control Over Foreign News Sources, supra note 69.
101. Id. (banning the general distribution of foreign newspapers, news magazines, and television
programs by the government).
102. Id.
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news providers comply with Chinese laws and regulations.10
3
Here again we see the shift in focus to how China's laws may be more
readily complied with, rather than what the U.S. and E.U. are arguing,
which is the compatibility of certain Chinese laws with the larger stage of
international law. The continued mistrust of Western motives is perhaps a
sentiment shared by most developing countries when considering the
stringent rules-based WTO created by Western powers to serve their needs.
The U.S. mission in Geneva has rejected China's reasoning that the
financial information suppliers fall under the category of general news
agencies. The mission has stated, "[s]uppliers of financial information
services provide a specialized service to these clients incorporating the
news, data, analysis, and commentary that they require to make fast and
effective business and investment decisions. This is not like general
broadcast or general news services to the public at large. 10 4 It is arguable
that this statement by the U.S. mission in Geneva supports its position that
suppliers of financial information are distinct from general new providers
and China's argument that the financial information services are in fact
news agencies.
From China's perspective, it can be argued that suppliers of financial
information are merely a special and particularized subset within the
broader category of general news services. That by virtue of its narrow
focus and purpose, it more nearly qualifies as a financial service provider
(i.e., a bank or insurance company) than as a news agency. Alternatively,
China may argue that by the very definition given by the U.S., suppliers of
financial information admit to incorporating news into its services. It
would not be untenable for China to reason that in an area so intricately
connected with the general news and where a fair portion of the
information related concerns events that would be broadcasted by general
news agencies, such financial information suppliers fall closer on the
spectrum to a news agency. However one argues China's position and
rationale, it will be no easy feat to successfully circumvent China's
accession agreement to broaden market access for foreign financial services
since they were accorded their own separate category apart from "news
agencies." What is really at issue is whether the U.S. and E.U. will judge
China by its overall WTO compliance or this specific dispute involving
news censorship that China feels requires some protection from foreign
competition.




2. WTO Accession-Censorship Issue
Perhaps the most disconcerting and solid issue upon which the U.S.
and E.U. may stand upon is that, in its accession agreement, China
committed that, for the services included in its Services Schedule, the
"relevant regulatory authorities would be separate from, and not
accountable to, any service suppliers they regulated, with two specified
exceptions."' 05 Of the services included in the Services Schedule, and not
listed as an exception, is the "provision and transfer of financial
information, and financial data processing and related software by suppliers
of other financial services." 10 6 As noted earlier, the state-owned Xinhua
News Agency, is not only a major market competitor of the foreign
financial information service providers in China, it is also the regulator of
such foreign providers. As early as 2005, U.S. and other foreign financial
information service providers protested the conflict posed by the overlap
and sought the establishment of an independent regulator. 
107
Now, WTO panels and Appellate Bodies face the unappealing task of
trying to decide when a given part of China's system of information control
represents a measure that combats the type of threat stated immediately
above. This question is especially difficult if the censored content is
potentially more of a threat to the CCP or to a favored local company as is
the case here. Here we see how Eastern and Western tensions come to a
head when a Western dominated international organization is called to
judge upon the necessity of another country's protectionist measures
according to its Western values and legal interpretations.
From China's viewpoint, the 2006 Measures merely involve the
continuation of a system of government oversight and not as erecting a
trade barrier in violation of either its 2001 WTO accession agreements or
its GATS obligations. For China, the protection of its people via ensuring
social stability and order and maintaining national security by filtering the
voluminous amount of information entering the country suffice as a
"fundamental societal interest." Furthermore, it may be that in the areas
where China has agreed to liberalize, China has plans for a more gradual
overall liberalization. However, the last point may be difficult for China to
argue considering that the 2006 Measures are in fact slightly stricter than
the 1996 Measures that were in place at the time of China's 2001 accession
to the WTO.' °8 Still, if China could successfully argue that a GATS
105. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2006 Nat'l Trade Estimate 133, (2006), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/ReportsPublications/2007/2007 NTE-Report/Section-Index.
html.
106. Id. at 133.
107. Id. at 133.
108. Steven Weisman, US. and E. U Protest a Chinese News Regulation, NY TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at 3.
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exception applies, it may affect how the WTO panel construes the 2006
Measures in light of China's accession commitment to liberalize the
market."10 9
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S.
AND CHINA BUSINESS RELATIONS
As of early March 2008, the 2006 Measures were already' creating
business uncertainty as well as concerns about future commercial
development for U.S. companies in China.110 Unlike a typical participant
within a domestic system, China possesses more power to either ignore or
to terminate its GATS commitments as it sees fit.' 11 There is no police
force or other enforcement arm to the WTO to compel China to observe
world trade law. 1 2 In fact, China could very well announce that it will no
longer honor specific GATS commitments. Whether China can feasibly
engage in such an act and not suffer any consequences depends upon
international relations rather than physical coercion. If a WTO member
fails to change its law to comply with a final report, it must consult with the
injured party and attempt to reach an agreement on an appropriate
compensation amount. 3 Failing such an agreement, the injured party has
the option of retaliating by suspending its own trade obligations to the
offending party.'1
4
While there may be the possibility that the WTO panel will announce
that the filtering of content is presumptively allowed, such likelihood
remains dim at this point. Furthermore, the strong possibility of retaliation
measures by members of the WTO pending the outcome of a panel
decision unfavorable to China if China subsequently refuses to alter its
regulatory measures will provide strong incentive for the U.S. and China to
settle their dispute. The threat of having to compensate the injured party
and the potential for broken relationships among powerful international
economic players should provide enough incentive to all parties involved to
reach an amicable compromise that addresses the concerns of the parties
while remaining palatable as well.
Whatever the U.S. and E.U. may think of China's demonstrated
concern over maintaining social and economic stability and order, they
cannot deny that they are legitimate interests of a country wishing to
109. World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, at 37 (Oct.
2001).
110. Pruzin & McLaughlin, supra note 62.
111. Wu, supra note 28, at 284
112. Id. at 284-85.




remaining Communist while adapting to and facing the challenges of rapid
economic growth in a country of around 1.3 billion people. Earlier this
year, Premier Wen Jiabao declared that the decline of the dollar and a
global economic slowdown will "add to China's already daunting
economic challenges this year" and make 2008 an especially difficult year
for the central government to preserve stable economic growth." 5 The
country has witnessed five years of double-digit economic growth and the
recent rapid inflation has some analysts claiming that China is
overheating. " 6
At the same time, China must recognize the commitments it made in
both the GATS and its WTO accession agreements however legitimate its
concerns are over maintaining order and stability. It must decide how
much of the 2006 Measures comprise true need versus simply a preferable
level of control over domestic well-being and competition. The burden on
the Western developed countries in the WTO are much greater. They must
deal with the criticism levied at them as the creators of the WTO regarding
its lack of transparency and its rules-based system favoring developed
countries. They must also learn to exercise more flexibility and
understanding when dealing with countries, like China, who have vastly
different legal backgrounds and systems of government and recognizing
them as legitimate.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, while China may argue that its 2006 Measure is justified in
regulating the release of news and information in China by foreign news
agencies to promote the dissemination of news in a sound and orderly
manner, it will need to arrive at an understanding with the U.S. and E.U.
regarding their differing interpretations involving censorship and legal
tradition. China does bring a compelling argument to the table regarding
national protection and the need to foster its own fledgling industries in the
wake of its economic boom. After all, the argument is that the currently
dominating Western countries were allowed to develop in a protectionist
environment and so should China. As persuasive as its need for security
may be, China's WTO accession agreements require that China must at the
very least establish an independent regulatory agency in regulating foreign
financial information suppliers.
The truth of the matter is that as sovereign States, it cannot be the case
that nations will simply open up their borders to every good and service
115. Kathleen McLaughlin, China's Premier Says '08 Will Offer Challenges to Maintaining Stable
Growth, 25:13 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 450 (Mar. 27, 2008).
116. Id.
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attempting entry. China need not relinquish all of its control over
telecommunications, for no country is quite that generous or naive. For
now, the U.S. and the E.U. should settle for more relaxed regulations in
China established by an independent regulatory body while still complying
with its literal WTO commitments. In doing so, the U.S. and E.U. will be
acknowledging the growing international presence of China and allow
China to carve out a position of power among them. This is not to say that
disputes over censorship versus GATS obligations and freedom of speech
will no longer be issues, but rather that such tensions will continue to
reemerge and that Western attitudes toward socialist systems of
government must change.
China will learn to play ball with the established international
economic organization created by Western countries with Western notions,
but in the process it will also transform the WTO through its participation
and counter-demands. As China rises, global economic institutions with
the traditional Western slant in views must learn to accommodate and share
power with a wholly different culture rich in history and values of its own.
All countries have interests to serve which are contrary to their
international obligations and it is important that these interests do not
conflict substantially with the WTO Agreements. But, industrialized
nations must acknowledge and make allowances reflecting the inequality in
the trade relationships between themselves and developing countries such
as China. The inability of developed nations to recognize the limitations
developing countries face, and the insistence on complete liberalization,
smacks of hypocrisy. Western legal scholars should cease to measure
China's legal system against the standards of an often idealized version of
liberal democratic rule of law that does not exist in reality anywhere.
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